Special Feature:
Selection 2022

Assumptions and Approach:

Assumptions:

1. Xi’s political strength: strongest position from a personnel standpoint
2. Criteria for PBSC membership: age and current membership of Politburo
3. Size of PBSC: no change
4. Successors on PBSC: no

Approach:

Xi’s political strength sets the parameter within which our projections for the base case are made. Ever since the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi has had a “supermajority”—that is, ~80% of the current Politburo members have very strong or strong ties to Xi.

Despite the past year of Zero Covid and a slumping economy, Xi has emerged relatively unscathed from a political standpoint. Moreover, there is no obvious opposition to seriously challenge the various coalitions Xi has cobbled together to form a strong political base.

As such, the candidate pool for the new PBSC is the 25-member Politburo where it is already stacked with many of Xi’s closest allies. (Few “dark horse” candidates outside of the Politburo, such as He Lifeng, were entertained but ultimately dismissed as low probability.)

With the candidate pool settled, we determined that three spots in the PBSC will open up.

Li Zhanshu (71) and Han Zheng (68) will step down from the PBSC due to the strong age norm. Although Xi himself is exempt from the age rule—which is actually a strong precedent for General Secretaries—we believe it remains a key determinant of retirements and promotions.

Of the four remaining members who have not hit the retirement age, Li Keqiang (67) will be the exception to the rule and step down, opening up the third spot.

Li technically can remain in the PBSC based on age, but there is no obvious position for him. The premiership is term limited and every other position on the PBSC would constitute a demotion because Li is already ranked second. While it’s possible that Li could stay on to head the National People’s Congress (NPC), that seems to be a less viable option given Xi’s likely preference for one of his allies to take the NPC role.

Li’s “early retirement” means that Hu Chunhua, a Li ally and current vice premier, will secure a spot in the PBSC. This could well be the result of an arrangement in which Li steps down earlier in exchange for elevating a candidate who can represent his interests.

However, Hu is unlikely to become the next premier because Xi will likely promote his ally Chen Min’er into the PBSC to replace Han Zheng as Executive Vice Premier. Appointing Chen in that position would clearly signal that he is slated for the premiership in 2027, which would be quite difficult if Hu becomes premier in 2022. That’s because Hu would be young enough to serve two terms, effectively shutting out Chen’s chances. Therefore, Hu is more likely to be appointed to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference position.

The other viable candidate in Chen’s spot would be Li Qiang. Although Xi seems to favor Li, we are handicapping him based on the age norm. Already 63-years-old, Li would be 68 in 2027 and would have to step down, leaving Xi with another no premier problem in five years. Therefore, the younger Chen should have the edge as Executive Vice Premier, in our view.

That means Xi still needs a premier in the 20th PBSC, a role likely to go to Wang Yang, who is broadly aligned with Li’s coalition. The premiership requires considerable credentials and competence, and typically having served as vice premier is a major qualification. Wang ticks all those boxes, and since he will remain on the PBSC, that makes him the most likely pick.

With two spots filled by Hu and Chen, the promotion of these next-gen politicians may be interpreted as Xi anointing “heir apparents.” But their likely roles on the PBSC, as projected above, will imply that neither is designated a “successor-in-waiting.” In addition, now that Xi will serve a third term, no likely candidate in the new PBSC will be young enough to serve two terms come 2027—an important criteria for the next General Secretary.

The final spot is a very close call between Cai Qi and Ding Xuexiang. Both have very strong ties to Xi’s, but we give Cai a miniscule edge because of his experience and relative seniority. Moreover, given his age (66), this is Cai’s last hurrah in his political career, whereas Ding would still be eligible in 2027.

Not only has Cai known Xi since his Fujian days, Cai was appointed the executive deputy director of the National Security Commission in Xi’s first term (Li Zhanshu was then-director). That was Cai’s stepping stone to becoming Party Secretary of Beijing, suggesting that Xi has confidence and trust in him.

With the three vacancies filled, this lineup will mean 5 to 2 in favor of Xi and his allies, balanced across his three main power bases (Zhejiang, Fujian, and Shaanxi). Moreover, there is no clear successor and at least four of the members are one-termers because of age. That means only Hu and Chen will remain in the PBSC come 2027, and Xi will have an ally as premier and a near blank slate in the PBSC.

Assumptions and Approach:

Assumptions:

1. Xi’s political strength: strongest position from a personnel standpoint.
2. Criteria for PBSC membership: age and current membership of Politburo
3. Size of PBSC: no change
4. Successors on PBSC: no

Approach:

Xi’s political strength sets the parameter within which our projections for the lower probability scenario are made. Ever since the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi has had a “supermajority”—that is, ~80% of the current Politburo members have very strong or strong ties to Xi.

Despite the past year of Zero Covid and a slumping economy, Xi has emerged relatively unscathed from a political standpoint. Moreover, there is no obvious opposition to seriously challenge the various coalitions Xi has cobbled together to form a strong political base.

As such, the candidate pool for the new PBSC is the 25-member Politburo where it is already stacked with many of Xi’s closest allies. (Few “dark horse” candidates outside of the Politburo, such as He Lifeng, were entertained but ultimately dismissed as low probability.)

While most elements and rationale are similar to the base case, the main distinction in this scenario vs. our base case is the even stronger weighting of the age rule. That is, with the exception of Xi, it is a more black and white decision that those 68 years or older step down, while those 67 years or younger stay.

That implies whatever differences Xi and Li may have, the latter remains because he does not violate the age rule. But Li’s staying on also complicates matters, because it would allow for only two vacancies in the PBSC. That would likely prevent his ally Hu Chunhua from getting promoted, in our view, while Xi’s ally Chen Min’er would still make it in to fill the spot vacated by Han Zheng.

As in our base case, we give Chen a small edge because he’s younger than Li Qiang, the other viable candidate for the Executive Vice Premier position. That allows Chen to be a viable premier candidate come 2027.

Moreover, it would require a reordering of the PBSC ranks because Li Keqiang cannot be premier and would likely have to take over the NPC position. But because Li would not accept a lower rank, that means he and Wang Yang would have to switch positions, with the premier falling to the #3 spot.

While there is such precedent, when Wu Bangguo was #2 as head of the NPC and Wen Jiabao was #3 as premier in the Hu Jintao administration, altering that order again injects additional complications.

Finally, this scenario implies that by 2027, five spots will likely open up (only Chen Min’er will be young enough to stay on), potentially allowing Xi to run the tables in the PBSC and shut out non-loyalists. However, this is something that even Mao Zedong could not truly accomplish, which is why this is a less probable, albeit not wholly impossible, outcome in our view.